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                                                     ABSTRACT 
 
Globalisation has seen the development of a body of autono-
mous legal rules of international trade that bridge the gap between 
the two main legal families (common law and civil law). These new 
rules focus on the function rather than on the dogmatic origin or 
legal tradition behind a particular norm or principle. In Europe, 
there are various texts that harmonize private law and which con-
form to this model, such as the PECL, the DCFR or the CESL. 
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Within the European Union, this process of informal and decentral-
ized rulemaking has not yet resulted in the enactment of a European 
Civil Code (as even the CESL enactment has failed), but it has in-
fluenced national law (the modernization of the German BGB, the 
Dutch Civil Code, and the reform of the French Civil Code). This 
direct influence on national law constitutes one of the aims of these 
harmonizing legal texts as stated in the introduction to the “Draft 
Common Frame of Reference.” 
In Spain, the Civil Code enacted in 1889 has not been modern-
ized, although the Supreme Court has seen harmonized European 
Law as an instrument to integrate national law, especially through 
the construction of a new system of contractual liability (providing 
a unitary concept of non-performance and fundamental non-perfor-
mance, rules regarding termination of contract, and change of cir-
cumstances), recognising that the solutions of the Civil Code are 
mostly unsuitable for the new social reality.  
Otherwise the construction of the acquis communautaire has de-
livered a body of norms aimed at the protection of consumers (gen-
erally as the result of the transposition of EU legislation). This large 
volume of special regulations has been gathered together in a single 
“Consumer Protection Act” in Spain. In a different way, other coun-
tries such as Germany or the Netherlands have recently made the 
decision to incorporate consumer protection regulations into their 
civil codes.  
 
Keywords: harmonized European private law, acquis communau-
taire, modernization of European Civil Codes  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The clear tendency to modify the traditional civil codes of the 
late 19th century and the legal principles of the 20th,1 permits us to 
talk of a process of recodification in the 21st century. This may be 
                                                                                                             
 1. It has happened not only in Europe, with the examples of the German, 
Dutch and French Civil Codes, but also in other countries like Japan. The Japanese 
Civil Code, 110 years since its enactment, is in the process of a fundamental re-
form, particularly in the field of the law of obligations. 




due to a variety of reasons, but one of them is undoubtedly the fact 
that the social and economic premises of civil society upon which 
those codes were built have been transformed.  
Another element to be considered is the existence of an increas-
ingly harmonized body of transnational and international contract 
law formulated as a response to the rapid globalisation of the market 
economy. This has also contributed to bringing together the civil law 
and common law, traditionally split as two different systems.2 Some 
of the normative frameworks that have contributed to bridging the 
differences inside Europe are the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG3), the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, the 
Principles of European private law (UNIDROIT Principles), the 
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) and the Common Eu-
ropean Sales Law (CESL4).  
A further impetus for change has been the necessities of legal 
practice, as civil law courts have seen the need to create a huge col-
lection of case-law-like norms outside the letter of the civil codes in 
order to make their application practicable. All of these changes in-
dicate the necessity of both a re-examination of the Spanish Civil 
Code’s guiding principles and a recodification process.5 In 2009, the 
                                                                                                             
 2. European harmonized legal texts have been a source of inspiration for 
national legislators around Europe. In some cases because the traditional civil 
codes were found to be outdated (as in Germany), in other cases because the po-
litical situation has changed, as has been the case of post-communist Eastern Eu-
rope. In relation to the latter case, see Lajos Vékás, About Contract Law in the 
New Hungarian Civil Code, in 6 EUROPEAN REVIEW OF CONTRACT LAW 95-98 
(Stefan Grundmann ed., de Gruyter 2010); TADAS ZUKAS, EINFLUSS DER 
“UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS” UND DER 
“PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW” AUF DIE TRANSFORMATION DES 
VERTRAGSRECHTS IN LITAUEN (Stämpfli 2011); Mónika Jónzon, The Influence of 
European Private Law on the New Romanian Civil Code, 3 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT 568 (2012). 
 3. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG]. 
 4. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 0635 final (Oct. 11, 2011) [here-
inafter CESL]. 
 5. This is the situation in Spain and in France, where case law has developed 
some rules that do not correspond with those contained in the “black letter” of the 




Spanish Ministry of Justice published two proposals to reform the 
Spanish Civil Code (Law of Obligations) and the Commercial Code. 
The two proposals were elaborated by the so called Comisión Gen-
eral de Codificación,6 but the modernization has not yet taken place. 
The Spanish Supreme Court has seen harmonized European Law as 
an instrument to be integrated into national law, especially through 
the construction of a new system of contractual liability (providing 
a unitary concept of non-performance and fundamental non-perfor-
mance, rules regarding termination of contract, and change of cir-
cumstances), recognising that the solutions of the Civil Code are 
mostly unsuitable for the new social reality.  
The drafters of the new acts seeking to modernize the traditional 
civil codes in Europe addressed a large body of norms, fragmented 
as a result of the transposition of European Community (EC) legis-
lation7 and created with the aim of protecting consumers. These acts 
have generally been left outside of each nation’s civil code. These 
are mainly specialized statutes that regulate specific situations inside 
a contract where it is necessary to protect consumers. In relation to 
general contract terms, standard-form contracts are nowadays a 
common feature of commercial relationships. This type of contract 
does not fit well with codes that have been structured around the 
sanctity of the 19th century principle of party autonomy. Despite the 
potential benefits of standard provisions from the point of view of 
                                                                                                             
norm. For the situation in Spain, see Luz M. Martínez Velencoso, National 
Courts: How Can They Keep Track?, in COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW MEETS 
REALITY (Matthias Lehmann ed., Sellier European Law Pubs 2015). In France, 
one of the reasons for the enactment of Ordinance no. 2016-131, Feb. 10, 2016, 
reforming contract law, was that contract law had become a largely judge-made 
law. Since 1804, contract law has evolved very significantly outside of the Code 
thanks to the Court of Cassation. 
 6. Comisión General de Codificación, Propuesta de Anteproyecto de Ley de 
modernización del Derecho de obligaciones y contratos, Boletín de Información 
del Ministerio de Justicia (Supp. Jan. 2009) [hereinafter Spanish proposal to re-
form the Civil Code]. 
 7. One characteristic of EU Contract Law is fragmentation, as it does not 
contain any general rules applicable to all types of contracts and all types of con-
tracting parties, nor does it address every issue that could arise in the life cycle of 
a contract. 




the economic analysis of the law, courts tend to treat them with great 
suspicion. The ability of businesses to identify the efficient alloca-
tion of risks also gives them the opportunity to exploit consumers 
(or adherents in general) by printing standards terms much more fa-
vourable to them than to consumers, hence imposing upon them hid-
den risks.8 That is the reason why the Spanish Supreme Court is ap-
plying a so called control of transparency, understood as an instru-
ment to make sure that “the consumer has real knowledge of what 
the financial sacrifice is and of the legal burden that is derived from 
the contract.”9 Consequently, any clauses introduced in the contract 
that suffer from this lack of transparency are null and void. 
II. NEW TRENDS IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW:                                              
THE SITUATION IN SPAIN 
A. A Special Body of Norms for the Protection of Consumers 
 The acquis communautaire is a body of norms (the result of the 
transposition of EC legislation) aimed at the protection of consum-
ers that have generally been kept out of national civil codes. These 
specialized statutes usually deal with specific situations inside a 
contract where it is necessary to protect consumers (such as con-
sumer credits, guarantees in the sale, general contract terms, etc.). 
The sheer volume of special regulations has complicated the appli-
cation of the law to the extent that some countries, such as Spain, 
Austria, France, Greece, and the UK,10 have opted to collect these 
                                                                                                             
 8. Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting 
in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (2002). 
 9. See Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Sept. 8, 2014 (RJ 2014/4660). 
 
 
 10. For Spain, see Real Decreto Legislativo (Royal Legislative Decree) no. 
1/2007 (B.O.E. 2007, 287). For France, see CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION (Law 
no. 92-60, Jan. 18, 1992). For Austria, see BUNDESGESETZ (Federal Act) [B.G.], 
Mar. 8, 1979, establishing provisions for the protection of consumers. For Greece, 
see Law no. 2251/1994 on the protection of consumers. For United Kingdom, see 
the Consumer Rights Act 2015, an Act that consolidates existing consumer pro-
tection legislation and also gives consumers a number of new rights and remedies. 




norms in a single “Consumer Protection Act” or “Consumer Code” 
that, while not exactly a codification of consumer rules, is effec-
tively a compilation of them.11 The concept of consumer does not 
appear at all in the civil code of any of these countries (provided of 
course that they have one), yet there is a big distinction in their con-
tract law between special contracts concluded with consumers and 
ordinary contracts. In the latter, the traditional principle of freedom 
of contract is stronger because consumer protection norms are nor-
mally mandatory. Nevertheless, in recent decades, some countries 
such as Germany12 and The Netherlands13 have incorporated the 
concept of consumer into their civil codes. The matter is of signifi-
cance, as the majority of contracts in Europe are consumer con-
tracts.14 
An intermediate solution was adopted in Italy and in Austria. In 
Italy, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive15 and the Directive on 
certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guar-
antees16 were implemented by inclusion in the Italian Civil Code of 
new provisions (arts. 1469 bis-1469 sexies, 1519 bis-1519 nonies) 
that basically reproduce the content of the second aforementioned 
                                                                                                             
It was enacted with the aim of providing a “modern framework of consumer 
rights,” at https://perma.cc/H7QZ-3TQB. 
 11. Brigitta Lurger, The ‘Social’ Side of Contract Law and the New Principle 
of Regard and Fairness, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE (4th ed., Arthur 
S. Hartkamp et al. eds., Kluwer 2010). 
 12. The German Civil Code, modified in 2002, includes the EC consumer 
protection directives regime (e.g., for distance selling and e-commerce contract, 
see BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB], §§ 312-312f; for general contract terms, 
see BGB, §§ 305-310; and for warranties in sales contracts applicable to consum-
ers and particulars, see BGB, §§ 433-445). 
 13. Consumer protection norms were included in the BURGERLIJK WETBOEK 
[BW] (Dutch Civil Code), by a reform in 1992 (for provisions concerning general 
contract terms, see arts. 6:236 et seq., and for sales contract, see arts. 7:5 et seq.). 
 14. This can be seen in the high rate of citations of the European Court of 
Justice and European Law by national courts, see LISA CONANT, JUSTICE 
CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 83 (Cornell U. Press 
2002). 
 15.   Council Directive 93/13/EEC, Apr. 5, 1993, Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts. 
 16.  Directive 1999/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
May 25, 1999 [hereinafter Directive 1999/44]. 




Directive without being systematically inserted in the regulation of 
sales contract. One may note that the Swiss Civil Code contains a 
section aimed at the regulation of consumer protection.17 In Austria, 
the transposition of the Directive has been produced through the law 
on the reform of the law of warranties, May 8, 2001,18 which has 
changed some precepts of the Civil Code of Austria (ABGB) and 
the Consumer Protection Act. For that reason, the regime of the Di-
rective is applicable not only to consumer contracts, but also to busi-
ness to business contracts. 
Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Nor-
way), apart from their special regulations for consumer protection 
in which they share a longstanding tradition, have in their respective 
Contract Acts a general clause that allows the judge to annul or mod-
ify unfair contracts. The scope of application of this clause is not 
limited to contracts between businesses and consumers, in contrast 
to the Italian Directive on unfair terms. Therefore, it is applicable in 
all cases in which there is a contractual relationship where one party 
is considered strong and the other weak. Indeed, this provision has 
been applied in several cases to contracts concluded with banks in 
the context of the recent financial crisis, where the weak party, the 
                                                                                                             
 17. There are some consumer protection provisions in the Swiss Code of Ob-
ligations. Pursuant to the relevant provisions, an addressee of an unordered prod-
uct is neither obliged to return the product nor to store it. In addition, as far as 
door-to-door transactions are concerned (Swiss Code of Obligations, arts. 40a et 
seq.), the consumer has the right to revoke his offer or his declaration of ac-
ceptance if the offer was made (i) at his place of work, in living accommodations 
or in their surroundings; (ii) in public transportation, or on public streets and 
places; or (iii) at a promotional function combined with an excursion or a similar 
event. There is no right of revocation if the consumer explicitly solicited the con-
tract negotiations or made his declaration at a market or trade fair stand. The rev-
ocation must be declared in writing within 7 days, after having offered or accepted 
the contract and after having received the said information. 
In the area of e-commerce, pursuant to the Swiss Code of Obligations, it is possi-
ble to conclude a purchase contract through an electronic signature. All require-
ments are regulated in the Swiss Federal Law on Electronic Signatures, Dec. 19, 
2003. 
 18. GewährleistungsrechtsÄnderungsgesetz’, BGBl. I 48/2001, p. 1019. This 
law came into force on Jan. 1, 2002. 
 
 




client of the bank (not necessarily a consumer) was not aware of the 
risks involved because of lack of proper information by the bank.19  
Furthermore, the CESL provides rules relating to the contents 
and effects of unfair contract terms that could be applied in “busi-
ness to business” (B2B) contracts.20 Good faith and fair dealing are 
also recognized, for instance in B2B transactions in the CESL, 
where the duty of good faith covers the pre-contractual disclosure of 
information about the main characteristics of the goods supplied 
(CESL art. 23). This is also the approach in the Principles of Euro-
pean Contract Law (PECL), where article 4:110 gives a definition 
of an unfair contract term, applicable both to B2B and “business to 
consumer” (B2C) contracts, borrowing its language from Directive 
93/13/EEC on Unfair Contract Terms in Consumer Contracts.21  
A similar regulation can be found in BGB, § 307,22 Dutch BW, 
                                                                                                             
 19. Hans Fredrik Marthinussen, Unfair Contract Terms, in EUROPEAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW 93-110 (Javier Plaza Pe-
nades & Luz M. Martinez Velencoso eds., Springer 2015) [hereinafter EUROPEAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CESL] (for an interesting analysis of case law). 
 20. See CESL, supra note 4, at section 3 chapter 8. 
Nevertheless, terms in B2B contracts are subject to unfairness control, but on the 
basis of a test less strict for the parties than the one applicable to B2C contracts. 
 21. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW art. 4:110 (Comm’n Eur. 
Cont. L. 2002) [hereinafter PECL]: 
(1) A party may avoid a term which has not been individually negotiated 
if, contrary to the requirements of good faith and fair dealing, it causes a 
significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under 
the contract to the detriment of that party, taking into account the nature 
of the performance to be rendered under the contract, all the other terms 
of the contract and the circumstances at the time the contract was con-
cluded. 
(2) This Article does not apply to: 
(a) a term which defines the main subject matter of the contract, provided 
the term is in plain and intelligible language; or to 
(b) the adequacy in value of one party's obligations compared to the 
value of the obligations of the other party. 
 22. BGB § 307 states: 
(1) Provisions in standard business terms are ineffective if, contrary to 
the requirement of good faith, they unreasonably disadvantage the other 
party to the contract with the user. An unreasonable disadvantage may 
also arise from the provision not being clear and comprehensible. 
(2) An unreasonable disadvantage is, in case of doubt, to be assumed to 
exist if a provision 
1. is not compatible with essential principles of the statutory provision 
from which it deviates, or 




art. 6:248 (2),23 and Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), § 2-30224 
applicable both to B2B and B2C contracts.25 
                                                                                                             
2. limits essential rights or duties inherent in the nature of the contract to 
such an extent that attainment of the purpose of the contract is jeopard-
ised. 
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) above, and sections 308 and 309 apply only 
to provisions in standard business terms on the basis of which arrange-
ments derogating from legal provisions, or arrangements supplementing 
those legal provisions, are agreed. Other provisions may be ineffective 
under subsection (1) sentence 2 above, in conjunction with subsection 
(1) sentence 1 above. 
JAN M. SMITS, CONTRACT LAW—A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 150 (2d ed., 
Edward Elgar Publ’g 2014): “The German statute has the widest scope of appli-
cation as it deals with any possibly unfair term in both B2B- and B2C-contracts.” 
 23. BW art. 6:248: “2. A rule, to be observed by parties as a result of their 
agreement, is not applicable in so far as this, given the circumstances, would be 
unacceptable to standards of reasonableness and fairness.” 
Cf. Martijn W. Hesselink, Unfair Terms in Contracts Between Businesses, in 
TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 143, 131-148 (Jules Stuyck & Reiner 
Schulze eds., Sellier 2011): 
Most Member States review unfair terms in business to business con-
tracts. They often do so on the basis of general contract law, i.e. legisla-
tion that does not distinguish between different categories of contracting 
parties, for example the general clause of Article 36 of the Scandinavian 
Contract Act, § 305 of the German Civil Code, and the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act (1977) in the United Kingdom. 
Often, for instance in Germany and the Netherlands, these statutory rules 
were preceded by case law, on the basis of the general good faith clause, 
where business to business contracts were the main field of application. 
From that perspective, the extension of the control of content took place 
in the opposite direction, from B2B towards B2C contracts. 
 24. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 [hereinafter UCC]: 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court 
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of 
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the 
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable 
result. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any 
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a rea-
sonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, pur-
pose and effect to aid the court in making the determination. 
A definition of an unconscionable contract is that it is a contract that “no man in 
his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and that no honest 
and fair man would accept on the other.” M. Neil Browne & Lauren Biksacky, 
Unconscionability and the Contingent Assumptions of Contract Theory, MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 216 (2013). 
 25. Ole Lando, CISG and CESL: Simplicity, Fairness and Social Justice, in 
ENGLISH AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT AND COMMERCIAL LAW: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HUGH BEALE 237-250 (Louise Gullifer & Stefan 
Vogenauer eds., Bloomsbury Publ’g 2017). 




In Spain, some recent judgments of the Supreme Court have 
found that a clause is unfair not only when there is an imbalance in 
the position of the contractual parties, but also when there is a lack 
of transparency. In a judgment delivered on May 9, 2013,26 the 
Spanish Supreme Court declared “floor clauses”27 to be unfair. In 
brief, it found that these clauses were not transparent as consumers 
were unable to foresee the economic and legal burden the contract 
would place upon them. 
Some scholars, interpreting this case, argue that the “control of 
transparency” is applicable in a standard terms contract even when 
none of the parties is a consumer. Indeed, standardized contracts 
represent a “profound transformation of the legal dogmatic,” distin-
guishable from the negotiated contract.28 This means that the valid-
                                                                                                             
 26. On May 9, 2013, the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled on the 
appeals against the judgment given by the Seville Provincial Appellate Court. The 
latter ruling, revoked the judgement rendered by the Commercial Court no. 2 of 
Seville; it rejected the claim made by the Association of Bank Users against 
BBVA, CAIXA GALICIA, and CAJA MAR, declaring that the “floor clauses” of 
the mortgage loan agreements entered into with variable interest rates signed with 
consumers and users of the aforementioned entities were not null and void. It 
deemed that the prerequisites contained in the General Law for the Defence of 
Consumers and Users for them to be considered abusive were not present. 
The Supreme Court, contrary to the reasoning of the Appellate Court, has declared 
the aforementioned clauses null and void, ordering the defendant entities to re-
move them from their agreements and to refrain from using them hereinafter in 
the form and manner in which they had been doing. 
The clauses lacked the clarity and transparency to enable the consumer to perceive 
that they defined the main purpose of the agreement, which in turn affected or 
may have affected the content of the consumer’s obligation to pay, as well as 
preventing him from obtaining a real and reasonably complete knowledge of how 
they played out or could have played out in the financial aspects of the agreement. 
They created an appearance that the floor had as an indivisible consideration, the 
fixing of a ceiling. The offer of variable interest was not completed with adequate 
information and was therefore misleading for the consumer, especially in cases 
where his attention was diverted and the analysis of the impact of the floor clause 
was made more difficult through the joint offer of ceiling clauses. 
 27. It is a clause that the bank can include in the mortgage, which establishes 
the minimum interest rate that the customer will pay even when the Euribor, 
which is the rate used as a reference for most Spanish mortgages, is lower. That 
is to say, it is a clause which does not allow the customer to benefit from the 
lowering of the Euribor rate. 
 28. See Supreme Court, S.T.S., Dec. 2, 2014 (R.J. 2014, 6872). 




ity and effectiveness of this kind of contract does not lie in the con-
sent of the adherent, but in the compliance by the stipulator to cer-
tain special contractual duties in order to balance the interests of the 
parties and to make the standard terms comprehensible. This inter-
pretation is essential for understanding the scope of the so-called 
“transparency review,” a second review after the “review of inclu-
sion” of the standard terms in the contract and prior to the “review 
of content,” as regulated in the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
“Transparency review” goes beyond the mere “formal require-
ment of drafting a clear and understandable clause” by the stipulator, 
to become the additional obligation of making the clause under-
standable “in a way that the adherent can assess the consequences to 
this contractual term.”29 Indeed in Spain, where these consumer pro-
tection norms are collected in a “Consumer Protection Act,” the act 
resulting from the transposition of the Unfair Contract Terms Di-
rective has been left out, as it has to be applied to any standardized 
contract, and does not require the participation of a consumer (alt-
hough for a clause to be declared abusive by means of its content, it 
is necessary that a consumer is affected).30 
B. Conformity of the Goods 
Traditionally the European civil codes, most of them strongly 
inspired by the French Civil Code, used to provide a double regime 
                                                                                                             
 29. FRANCISCO JAVIER ORDUÑA MORENO, CARLOS SÁNCHEZ MARTÍN, & 
RAQUEL GUILLÉN CATALÁN, CONTROL DE TRANSPARENCIA Y CONTRATACIÓN 
BANCARIA (Tirant lo Blanch 2016). 
 30. On June 3, 2016, the Plenary of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court 
decided by judgment no. 367/2016 (JUR 2016, 128769) that the control of trans-
parency applicable to the general conditions of contracts with consumers does not 
extend to contracts concluded with professionals or entrepreneurs. The judgement 
contained a dissenting vote by Judge Francisco Javier Orduña Moreno (previously 
a Civil Law Professor at the University of Valencia), in which he affirmed that 
transparency extends to standardized contracts between entrepreneurs, particu-
larly with regard to small and medium-sized businesses which act as mere adher-
ents. He maintains that, given that the control of transparency has become a gen-
eral principle of law, it has to be given an extensive interpretation in the contracts 
concluded between entrepreneurs. 




for the non-performance of contractual obligations “liability for hid-
den defects and warranties” and the general regime for the breach of 
the contract.  
This dual system is not reflected in the CISG and in harmonized 
European law (i.e., PECL, DCFR, CESL) where all is based on the 
principle of conformity of the goods. The same unitary regime also 
appears in the EU Directive on certain aspects of the sale of con-
sumer goods and associated guarantees.31  
Under this unitary approach, a non-conforming performance 
proves to be a specific type of non-fulfilment for sales contracts and 
follows a general principle of contract law: contracts have to be per-
formed in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The concept 
of conformity assigns more importance to the contractual terms, ac-
cording to the principle of party autonomy and pacta sunt servanda. 
To sum up, the concept of “lack of conformity” is much wider than 
that of “hidden defects” contained in the civil codes enacted in Eu-
rope in the 19th century, and “non-conformity” is the result of the 
comparison between the promised performance and actual perfor-
mance. The concept fits the current economic context, with a pre-
dominance of mass-produced goods, as against predominantly cus-
tomized goods in the 19th century. 
                                                                                                             
 31. In the different European Legal Texts, cf. Directive 1999/44, supra note 
16, at art. 2 (“Conformity with the contract”); PECL, supra note 21, art. 9:401 
refers to the right to reduce the price in cases of non-conformity; Draft Common 
Frame of Reference, section 3 (Conformity of the goods) at arts. IV.A- 2:301 et 
seq. [hereinafter DCFR]; CESL, supra note 4, at section 3 (Conformity of the 
goods and digital content) arts. 99 et seq. 
See also María Paz García Rubio, Non Conformity of Goods and Digital Content 
and its Remedies, in EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CESL, supra note 19, at 
163: 
The rules concerning the non-performance and conformity of the con-
tract included in CESL are a direct inheritance from the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) re-
defined by Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of the 25th of May 2009 on certain aspects of the sale of con-
sumer goods and associated guarantees, the case-law of the ECJ that in-
terprets the afore-mentioned Directive, and the Draft Common Frame-
work of Reference (DCFR). In all of these instruments the issue of con-
formity is one of the most significant topics. 




In addition, the concept of “lack of conformity” has a unifying 
effect. For instance, under the different criteria for conformity of 
goods contained in art. 2 of the Directive 1999/4432 there is a com-
bination of a subjective dimension and an objective dimension to 
determining the lack of conformity. The objective approach is char-
acteristic of French-inspired civil codes, such as the Spanish Code. 
According to the Spanish Code, the concept of the “vice” of a good 
is confined to its inaptitude for the use for which goods of the same 
type are usually intended. The subjective dimension is a particular 
feature of Germanic and common law, for which the concept of a 
defect includes the lack of those qualities in the good that the buyer 
expects.33 This subjective criterion was preferred by the European 
drafter, as can be observed in the legislative history of Directive 
1999/44. Nevertheless, due to the influence of the professional sec-
tors involved, the final text of the Directive placed both criteria on 
an equal footing. 
When Directive 1999/44 had to be transposed in the legal sys-
tems of Member States, two options were available. First was the 
                                                                                                             
 32. Directive 1999/44, supra note 16, at art. 2.2: Consumer goods are pre-
sumed to be in conformity with the contract if they: 
(a) comply with the description given by the seller and possess the qual-
ities of the goods which the seller has held out to the consumer as a sam-
ple or model; 
(b) are fit for any particular purpose for which the consumer requires 
them and which he made known to the seller at the time of conclusion of 
the contract and which the seller has accepted; 
(c) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same type are normally 
used; 
(d) show the quality and performance which are normal in goods of the 
same type and which the consumer can reasonably expect, given the na-
ture of the goods and taking into account any public statements on the 
specific characteristics of the goods made about them by the seller, the 
producer or his representative, particularly in advertising or on labelling. 
 33. Cf. C.J. (Niels) de Bruijn, Historical Perspectives on the Remedies for 
Non-Conformity with Contract in EU Consumer Sales Law, in ALTERNATIVE 
WAYS TO IUS COMMUNE: THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAW 111-124 
(Anne L.M. Keirse & Marco B.M. Loos eds., Intersentia 2012). 
 
 




so-called “big solution,” followed in Germany and in the Nether-
lands,34 whereby the regime of the Directive became the general re-
gime included in the civil code and applicable to every sale contract, 
whether one of the parties was a consumer or not. The second option 
was the so-called “small solution,” adopted by other countries. It 
consisted in transposing the Directive by a special act applicable to 
consumer sales only, amending the existing rules applicable to con-
sumers (such as the Code de la consommation in France), or intro-
ducing in the civil code a section on sales between professional 
sellers and consumer buyers (as is the case of Italy or Spain). This 
contributes to a certain “de-harmonization” of the legislation on 
sales in the various Member States. 
As a consequence, the Spanish Civil Code contains a double re-
gime for the non-performance of contractual obligations: “liability 
for hidden defects and warranties” and the general regime for the 
breach of the contract (arts. 1094 et seq.). This is because in Spain, 
Directive 1999/44 was the object of transposition through a special 
norm, Act 23/2003, July 10, on Guarantees in the Sale of Consumer 
Goods, applicable only to the sale of consumer goods, leaving intact 
the regime of the Civil Code. Subsequently, this Act was abrogated 
and its content was included in the Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007, 
Nov. 16, approving the revised text of the General Law for the Pro-
tection of Consumers and users and other supplementary Laws (a 
compilation of special norms for the protection of consumers result-
ing from the implementation of European Directives),35 in arts. 114 
et seq.  
                                                                                                             
 34. See Sonja A. Kruisinga, The Impact of Uniform Law on National Law: 
Limits and Possibilities – CISG and Its Incidence in Dutch Law, 13.2 ELECTRONIC 
J. OF COMP. L. 9 (2009), at https://perma.cc/8PLF-Z777: 
In the new rules on the sale of goods in the Dutch Civil Code, the notion 
of conformity replaced the regulation of hidden defects. This part of the 
Civil Code has been modelled after the aforementioned Benelux draft for 
a Uniform Law. The concept of (non-)conformity in art. 35 CISG corre-
sponds almost literally with the requirements in art. 7:17 BW. This pro-
vision was clearly – indirectly – inspired by the provisions in ULIS. Both 
provide that the goods need to be in conformity with the contract. 
 35. English text available at https://perma.cc/WSV4-UMMP. 




As for the modernization process in Spain, the proposal to re-
form the Civil Code (Law of Obligations) made by the Spanish Min-
istry of Justice36 has the aim, among others, of modernizing the reg-
ulation of the sales contract, taking the regime of the Directive 
1999/44 as a reference.37 In Spain, it is accepted among scholars that 
any reform which, now or in the future, aims at changing the Civil 
Code, has to be aligned with the harmonized European legal texts.38 
As the Spanish legislature has not yet completed this task, this 
work has been mostly done by the Spanish Supreme Court. As re-
gards the non-conformity of goods, courts are applying the general 
regime of non-performance to cases that could be included in the 
special regime.  
A good example of this is the judgment of the Supreme Court, 
Sept. 21, 2004, where the Court considered the jurisprudential prin-
ciple of aliud pro alio (delivery of one thing instead of another) as a 
remedy for situations of extreme injustice, due to the narrowness of 
the concept of hidden defects in the Civil Code. It connects with the 
principle of conformity of the goods enshrined in article 35 of the 
CISG, also applied to consumer sales under Act 23/2003 on guaran-
tees in the sale of consumer goods. Although none of these legal 
texts was applicable to the case, the Court interpreted the Code ac-





                                                                                                             
 36. Spanish proposal to reform the Civil Code, supra note 6. 
 37. Cf. Nieves Fenoy Picón, La modernización del régimen del incumpli-
miento del contrato: Propuestas de la Comisión General de Codificación. Parte 
primera: Aspectos generales. El incumplimiento, LXIII ANUARIO DE DERECHO 
CIVIL 64-65 (2010). 
 38. Luis Díez-Picazo, Reforma de los Códigos y Derecho Europeo, LVI 
ANUARIO DE DERECHO CIVIL 1574 (2003). 
 
 




C. The Legal Consequences of a Breach of Contract 
1. The Unitary Concept of Non-Performance 
The CISG has been a model in the field of breach of contract and 
its consequences for harmonized European private law39 and there-
fore, for the modernization of the civil codes in Europe. Under the 
CISG, a liable party is obligated to pay damages and the termination 
of the contract is only possible when the breach is severe and fun-
damental. This is also the solution in Directive 1999/44,40 and the 
German BGB has also accepted it in the general law of obligations.  
The CISG model bridges the common law and the civil law as it 
“has been the standpoint of the common law that a party is liable for 
keeping its contractual promise in principle irrespective of any fault, 
whereas the civilian tradition held the party liable for any breach of 
contract only if the party was at fault.”41 In the CISG, a party is not 
held liable in cases where performance has become impossible due 
to circumstances for which this party neither bore the risk nor was 
                                                                                                             
 39. Cf. Ole Lando, Non-performance (Breach) of Contracts, in TOWARDS A 
EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 505 (3d ed., Arthur S. Hartkamp et al. eds., Kluwer 2004): 
In the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) the Commission on 
European Contract Law (CECL) has set up a structure and terms for a 
future European Code in relation to the “breach of contract.” In doing 
this the CECL has been guided by two main considerations. The first is 
to have a structure which is compatible with that of the CISG. The sec-
ond is to use one which in principle may apply to all kind of contracts 
and not only to the sale of goods. 
 40. The acquis communautaire tends to provide a general concept of the vi-
olation of the obligation and to apply some remedies that do not depend on a qual-
ified kind of non-performance (such as delay or impossibility). For instance, apart 
from Directive 1999/44, supra note 16, the art. 13 (3) of Directive 2015/2302, 
2015 O.J. (L 326) (EU), on package travel and linked travel arrangements, states 
that: “If any of the travel services are not performed in accordance with the pack-
age travel contract, the organiser shall remedy the lack of conformity . . . .” 
 41. Ulrich Magnus, The Vienna Sales Convention (CISG) between Civil and 
Common law – Best of all Worlds?, 3 J. CIV. L. STUD. 75 (2010). Under English 
Law, liability is strict, non-performance is “excused” in the limited cases of frus-
tration. Harmonized European private law does not adopt the English distinction 
between breaches of condition, warranty, and intermediate terms. 




at fault (CISG art. 79). The CISG model also includes the concepts 
of force majeure and economic hardship.42  
Defining contract non-performance in Spanish Law is problem-
atic because it encompasses two different things: it covers the lack 
of performance but also the so-called mora debitoris or delay in per-
formance, which differs from cases of simple delay.43 Furthermore, 
there has been a long discussion as to whether the liability of the 
debtor for the breach should be based on fault or if it is better to have 
an objective system of contractual liability.44 There is also no coher-
ent regulation in relation to the claim for performance, termination, 
and compensation of damages. 
Harmonized European private law is clearer as there is a unique 
concept of non-performance and some remedies. First comes the 
claim of specific performance. This remedy is not possible when 
fulfilment of the contract has become impossible. It also requires 
that the claim be exercised without further delay. Also, the other 
contractual party can object to the claim if specific performance is 
excessively burdensome (an intermediate solution between common 
law and civil law).  
Secondly, it is possible to terminate the contract, but only when 
the breach of the contract qualifies as “fundamental.” This new reg-
ulation allows the creditor to elevate a non-fundamental delay in 
performance to a fundamental one by means of granting a grace pe-
riod. This does not, however, apply in cases of defective perfor-
mance.  
The third remedy is compensatory damages. The debtor that 
breached the contract is liable for the damage caused, except in the 
                                                                                                             
 42. Cf. Pablo Salvador Coderch, Comentario del artículo 79, in LA 
COMPRAVENTA INTERNACIONAL DE MERCADERÍAS. COMENTARIO DE LA 
CONVENCIÓN DE VIENA 635-656 (Luis Díez-Picazo & Antonio Cabanillas Sán-
chez eds., Editorial Aranzadi 1998). 
 43. The simple delay is irrelevant. The debtor will only be held responsible 
if the creditor requires the debtor to fulfil the contract. This is a requirement in 
order to obtain compensation for the damage that has been caused by means of 
the delay. 
 44. Díez-Picazo, supra note 38. 




circumstance that without the default of either party a contractual 
obligation has become incapable of being performed because the 
circumstances in which the performance is called for would render 
it impossible. 
In the above mentioned Proposal to reform the Spanish Civil 
Code,45 the drafters adopt a broad and unitary notion of non-com-
pliance. The debtor who breaches the contract does not fulfil exactly 
the provision or any other of the duties resulting from the obliga-
tion.46 This is in accordance with the Principles of European Con-
tract Law. As the Official Commentary on the PECL makes clear: 
Under the system adopted by the Principles there is non-per-
formance whenever a party does not perform any obligation 
under the contract. The non-performance may consist in a 
defective performance or in a failure to perform at the time 
performance is due, be it a performance which is effected too 
early, too late or never. It includes a violation of an accessory 
duty such as the duty of a party not to disclose the other par-
ty's trade secrets. Where a party has a duty to receive or ac-
cept the other party's performance a failure to do so will also 
constitute a non-performance.47 
In the Spanish Proposal, if the fulfilment of the contract becomes 
definitively impossible, even without the fault of the debtor, it is still 
a case of breach of the contract (art. 1188.I). The notion of breach 
includes both an excusable and non-excusable breach. Nevertheless, 
this distinction has some effects on the scope of remedies. Accord-
ing to article 1209.I of the Proposal, the debtor is not responsible for 
the damage that the breach has caused to the creditor in cases of 
excusable breach of contract. However, article 1209.IV of the Pro-
posal provides that in this case, the creditor is not prevented from 
seeking remedies other than damages such as the termination of the 
                                                                                                             
 45. See Spanish proposal to reform the Civil Code, supra note 6. 
 46. Id. at art. 1188.I. 
 47. See Comment and Notes: PECL art. 8:101: Remedies Available, Com-
ment A. Non-performance, CISG DATABASE, available at https://perma.cc 
/M3WU-MCVZ. 




contract or the price reduction (following the model of CISG art. 
79). 
In the PECL, art. 1:301(4) explicitly clarifies that there is a 
breach of contract whether the non-fulfilment is excused or not.48 
PECL art. 8:108 defines when the non-fulfilment is excused.49 In 
this case, “the aggrieved party may resort to any of the remedies set 
out in Chapter 9 except claiming performance and damages.”50  
This is exactly the model in DCFR art. III.–1:102(3)51 comple-
mented by DCFR art. III.–3:101, also adopted by the European 
Commission in CESL art. 87.52 However, there are some differ-
                                                                                                             
 48. Lando, supra note 39, at 506: 
The legal systems will allocate detrimental consequences to the default-
ing party if that party is in fault or carries the risk. The failure to perform 
may give the other party – the aggrieved party – certain rights against the 
defaulting party. The aggrieved party may have a right to damages for 
the loss he suffers from the other party’s failure to effect due perfor-
mance. If he accepts a tender of performance not conforming to the con-
tract he may reduce his own performance. Furthermore, he may withhold 
his performance until the other party makes a due performance. Under 
certain conditions he may terminate the contract . . . . The aggrieved party 
may finally have a right to specific performance, that is to claim that the 
contract be performed as agreed. All these rights are here called reme-
dies. 
 49. PECL, supra note 21, at art. 8:108: 
(1) A party's non-performance is excused if it proves that it is due to an 
impediment beyond its control and that it could not reasonably have been 
expected to take the impediment into account at the time of the conclu-
sion of the contract, or to have avoided or overcome the impediment or 
its consequences. 
(2) Where the impediment is only temporary the excuse provided by this 
article has effect for the period during which the impediment exists. 
However, if the delay amounts to a fundamental non-performance, the 
obligee may treat it as such. 
(3) The non-performing party must ensure that notice of the impediment 
and of its effect on its ability to perform is received by the other party 
within a reasonable time after the non-performing party knew or ought 
to have known of these circumstances. The other party is entitled to dam-
ages for any loss resulting from the non-receipt of such notice. 
 50. Cf. PECL, supra note 21, at art. 8:101. 
 51. DCFR, supra note 31, at art. III. – 1:102 (3): “Non-performance of an 
obligation is any failure to perform the obligation, whether or not excused, and 
includes delayed performance and any other performance which is not in accord-
ance with the terms regulating the obligation.” 
 52. “One could and should read this proposal and its predecessors in the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference on the Principles of European Contract Law as a 




ences, as the draft Common European Sales Law in art. 87 only de-
fines a uniform notion of non-performance but does not refer to any 
excuse for impediment beyond the parties’ control or for the credi-
tor’s misbehavior. The consequences of an excuse in CESL art. 88 
are only regulated in the rules on remedies (CESL arts. 106(4), 
131(2), 167(1), 168(1)). Otherwise in the DCFR and the PECL there 
is a distinction between two separate categories of excused non-per-
formance and inexcusable non-performance.53 
2. Fundamental Non-Performance and Termination of the Con-
tract 
Termination is considered a subsidiary remedy both in the com-
mon and in the civil law tradition. In common law, termination is 
only possible if the obligation which has been broken is a “condi-
tion” of the contract or if the breach is “fundamental.” In civil law 
countries, termination needs further requirements.54  
                                                                                                             
mirror of the development of contract law, and sales law in particular, in Europe,” 
see Martin Schmidt-Kessel & Eva Silkens, Breach of Contract, in EUROPEAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CESL, supra note 19, at 112. 
 53. See id. at 115: 
From a pragmatic point of view this difference may be seen as minor, 
however, for dogmatically trained continental lawyers this shift is of an 
importance which should not be underestimated. The text and the struc-
ture of the Commission’s proposal prevents or, at least, should help to 
prevent dogmatic national lawyers from raising systematical arguments 
based on two different types of breach. Coming from a legal system with 
a bad experience with cause approaches and their necessities to draw 
lines between these types of breach, the solution proposed by the Com-
mission to us seems an important and innovative progression in the for-
mulation and structuring of European Contract Law. 
 54. For a comparative analysis of the CISG, the PECL, and English Law on 
this topic, see CISG, supra note 3; PECL, supra note 21; and see EWAN 
MCKENDRICK, CONTRACT LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 791 et seq. (6th 
ed., Oxford U. Press 2014). In English law, termination is an important remedy 
(although not as important as damages). In addition, English law, on the basis of 
the principle of freedom of contract, confers the parties’ freedom to decide them-
selves when the right to terminate will arise (they have the opportunity to classify 
any term as a condition). Whereas, in other legal systems, it depends on the court 
to decide whether or not the breach justifies termination. CISG (art. 25) appears 
to deny to the parties the right to agree that any breach of a particular term shall 
give rise to a right to terminate. This is because there is a preference for remedies 
that enable the parties to maintain their relationship (like the right to cure the 




This subsidiary nature is because termination faces serious fac-
tors of complexity. Its use as a remedy assumes the end of the con-
tractual relationship and perhaps the elimination of the conse-
quences arising from the contract that have already been fulfilled. 
Termination is difficult to understand in universal terms for all con-
tracts and for all modalities of non-fulfilment. In addition, it does 
not respond nor adapt to a general model, because there is a great 
variety of factors (the moment in which the non-fulfilment took 
place and costs associated; the specific investments made; the fluc-
tuation of prices; the existence of markets for resale, etc.) that can 
have a high differential significance in terms of its effects on the 
contracting parties and their incentives for action in view of such 
effects. 
Being aware of the costs associated with the termination of the 
contract, legal systems create doctrines, principles, and rules that 
modulate the exercise of such a remedy (such as fundamental 
breach,55 favor contractus principle, and the debtor's right to cure 
                                                                                                             
breach and price reduction). Nevertheless, as explained by McKendrick, the pro-
visions of the PECL (art. 8:103) appear to be closer to English law: 
To English eyes, this provision is very different from the Vienna Con-
vention. The vital difference is paragraph (a) which seems to approxi-
mate a condition. It thus appears to preserve the right of the parties to 
classify the status of the terms of their contract. Paragraph (b) is much 
closer to an intermediate term, while paragraph (c) distinguishes between 
intentional and unintentional non-performance (a distinction which is not 
generally drawn in English law). 
 55. Reinhard Zimmermann, Breach of Contract and Remedies under the New 
German Law of Obligations, 48 SAGGI, CONFERENZE E SEMINARI (2002) (It.), 
available at https://perma.cc/6358-Y3GU: 
The notion that the remedy of termination is available only if the non-
performance attains a certain minimum level of seriousness is also re-
flected, in some or other form, in most of the more traditional national 
legal systems; it is based on the consideration that termination, in a way, 
jeopardizes the fundamental principle of pacta sunt servanda and has the 
effect of throwing back on the defaulting party a risk which, according 
to the contract, was to have been borne by the aggrieved party. 
Roman law was even stricter in this regard and never recognized a gen-
eral right of termination in case of breach of contract. This approach has, 
for a long time, dominated the ius commune, and it has even shaped the 
BGB. 





Under the PECL, termination is available in cases of a funda-
mental breach of the contract. The BGB57 and the Dutch Civil 
Code58 require the granting of a period of grace before the remedy 
of termination is available. Also, in CESL arts. 114-115, 134 and 
136 for commercial buyers, the remedy of termination is subject to 
                                                                                                             
Before the reform, the German BGB did not contain a general statutory right of 
termination, it used to provide a highly fragmented regime which was conceptu-
ally based on a lex commissoria that had been tacitly agreed upon. The duty to 
perform was extinguished if performance became impossible, as a result of the 
debtor's fault and also, in the case that the debtor had not been responsible for the 
impossibility of performance; in cases of mora debitoris, and in those of defective 
performance, provided it seriously affected the contractual relationship. As Pro-
fessor Zimmermann says, “the rules contained in the BGB were not generally ad-
mired for their clarity and ease of operation.” Id. 
 56. Fernando Gómez Pomar & Marian Gili Saldaña, La complejidad econó-
mica del remedio resolutorio por incumplimiento contractual—Su trascendencia 
en el Derecho español de contratos, en la normativa común de compraventa eu-
ropea (CESL) y en otras propuestas normativas, in LXVII ANUARIO DE DERECHO 
CIVIL 1218-1219 (2014). 
 57. See Zimmermann, supra note 55, comparing the PECL, supra note 21, 
with German Law: it can be stated that “[t]ermination under the Principles is 
available in cases of fundamental breach of the contract.” Furthermore, the Ger-
man BGB “requires the granting of a period of grace before the remedy of termi-
nation is available,” although there are exceptions to this requirement in certain 
cases of serious breach. Both under the PECL art. 8:106 (3) and in German Law, 
the creditor only loses his right to choose between claiming performance and ter-
minating the contract at the moment he gives notice of termination. The mecha-
nism of termination is the same in the German BGB and in the PECL art. 9:303 
(1): “a party’s right to terminate the contract is to be exercised by notice to the 
other party.” Nevertheless, sometimes even a notice of termination is dispensable 
because the contract is terminated automatically, the BGB §326 relates to cases 
of impossibility and art. 9:303 (4) of the PECL refers to the situation where a party 
is excused under art. 8:108 in view of an impediment, which is total and perma-
nent. 
 58. See Kruisinga, supra note 34, at 13: 
In the Dutch Civil Code, the right to avoid a contract is regulated in Arts. 
6:265-277 BW. art. 6:265(1) BW provides that poor performance or non-
performance of the obligation of a party, allows the other party to avoid 
the contract, unless this remedy is inappropriate considering the special 
nature or the limited extent of the breach of contract. The creditor is thus 
allowed to choose this remedy, except where the non-performance is of 
minor importance. 
See CISG, supra note 3; PECL, supra note 21: Scholars in the Netherlands have 
defended the position that this article should be interpreted according to the CISG, 
so that termination is only possible in the case of a fundamental breach of the 
contract. Nevertheless, this argument was rejected by the Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands; see HR Feb. 4, 2000, NJ 2000, 562 m.nt. JBMV (Mol/Meijer Be-
heer) (Neth.). 




the requirement that the non-fulfillment is fundamental. Non-fulfill-
ment is fundamental when non-performance “substantially deprives 
the other party of what that party was entitled to expect under the 
contract, unless at the time of conclusion of the contract the non-
performing party did not foresee and could not be expected to have 
foreseen that result” or “it is of such a nature as to make clear that 
the non-performing party’s future performance cannot be relied 
on.”59 A buyer will lose this right to terminate the contract “if notice 
of termination is not given within a reasonable time from when the 
right arose or the buyer became, or could be expected to have be-
come, aware of the non-performance, whichever is later.”60 
Nevertheless, according to the CESL, in B2C transactions where 
there is non-performance because the goods do not conform to the 
contract, the consumer may terminate the contract unless the lack of 
conformity is insignificant.61 Consequently, in this case the require-
ments for termination are not so strict. 
Concerning the concept of a fundamental breach, CISG art. 25 
states that:  
A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fun-
damental if it results in such detriment to the other party as 
substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect 
under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee 
and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same cir-
cumstances would have not foreseen such a result.62  
                                                                                                             
 59. CESL, supra note 4, at art. 87(2) (a) and (b). 
 60. CESL, supra note 4, at art. 119. The European Parliament proposed to fix 
this period at two months in order to increase legal certainty, see PARL. EUR. DOC. 
(A7-0301/001-264) 85-86 Amendment 201 (2014). 
 61. CESL, supra note 4, at art. 114 (2). 
 62. Aneta Spaic, Interpreting Fundamental Breach, in INTERNATIONAL 
SALES LAW 237 et seq. (Larry A. DiMatteo ed., Cambridge U. Press 2014). Aneta 
Spaic reviews a number of approaches that have been applied in order to deter-
mine fundamental breach. The author states that this situation has led to a great 
deal of uncertainty that a single approach would eliminate. For that reason, she 
proposes a definition combining a purposive approach (whether the aggrieved 
party has been substantially deprived of what he expected out of the contract) and 
a remedy-oriented approach (whether the aggrieved party’s interests can be pro-
tected through remedies short of avoidance). 




An exact definition of what constitutes a fundamental breach is 
not provided due to the many differences among the definitions of 
fundamental breach to be found in the various legal systems.63  
The delivery of defective goods is undoubtedly the most recur-
rent situation in international sales litigation. The number of deci-
sions dealing with this issue is relatively high, but what is more 
problematic is to determine the kind of deficiencies in the goods that 
may amount to a fundamental breach. In this field, the courts follow 
an economically oriented approach based on the loss suffered by the 
aggrieved party. Some elements judges take into consideration are 
the percentage of defective goods, the estimated cost of the repair 
compared to the total value of the goods, and the merchantability of 
the defective goods.64  
The PECL and the DCFR also consider that a fundamental 
breach occurs where the breach of the contract is intentional or reck-
less.65  
International instruments like the CISG, the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples, the PECL, and the DCRF harmonize the concept of fundamen-
tal breach.  
                                                                                                             
 63. PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & PETRA BUTLER, UN LAW ON INTERNATIONAL 
SALES—THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 100-101 
(Springer 2009): 
Of course, despite the attempt to consolidate the principle of fundamental 
breach through Article 25 CISG, there is still room for the national courts 
and arbitral tribunals to assess the concept of fundamental breach accord-
ing to the particular domestic understanding of fundamental breach, its 
significance in the particular national legal system, and the particular tra-
ditions which necessarily leads to slightly different approaches by dif-
ferent courts and tribunals. The German and the Swiss Supreme courts 
take a strict approach on fundamental breach whereas the French, Aus-
trian, and United States courts are more flexible in finding a fundamental 
breach and allowing avoidance of the contract. 
 64. Cf. Leonardo Graffi, Case Law on the Concept of “Fundamental 
Breach”in the Vienna Sales Convention, 3 INT’L BUS. L. J. 338-349 (2003), avail-
able at https://perma.cc/7UWA-Q55W. 
 65. “[H]olding every intentional breach to be fundamental independent of its 
significance does not fit to international trade practices and cannot be justified by 
the legitimate interest of the non-breaching party.” See Ingeborg Schwenzer & 
Pascal Hachem, Drafting New Model Rules on Sales: CFR as an Alternative to 
the CISG?, 11 EUR. J. L. REFORM 464 (2009). 




For the CISG, the criteria of foreseeability contained in article 
25 is extremely important. Even if the breach of contract results in a 
detriment to the other party that substantially deprives him of what 
he is entitled to expect, the breach is not fundamental if the party in 
breach of contract did not foresee such a result and a reasonable per-
son of the same kind in the same circumstances would not have fore-
seen such a result. Likewise, article 8:103 of the PECL contains a 
similar notion of foreseeability: the consequences of a breach should 
be foreseeable at the moment of the conclusion of the contract. The 
foreseeability requisite is made more objective by the reasonable-
ness criteria. In article 8:103(2) of the PECL, the test to be applied 
is not what the party in breach of contract did not foresee or could 
not have foreseen due to certain conditions, but rather what a rea-
sonable person, acting in good faith, in the same circumstances 
would not have foreseen. The CISG also uses the “reasonable person 
of the same kind in the same circumstances” criterion in art. 25. Un-
der art. III. – 3:502 of the DCFR, termination requires a fundamental 
non-performance of the debtor similar to the other mentioned texts, 
yet without the requirement of reasonableness.66 The same is true of 
art. 87.2 of the CESL.67 
Another criterion of fundamental breach is the concept of sub-
stantial deprivation, which is almost the same in the CISG, the 
PECL and the DCFR though with a difference of wording (“detri-
ment,” in the CISG; distinction between “strict compliance” and 
                                                                                                             
 66. See DCFR, supra note 31, at art. III. – 3:502 (2): 
A non-performance of a contractual obligation is fundamental if: (a) it 
substantially deprives the creditor of what the creditor was entitled to 
expect under the contract, as applied to the whole or relevant part of the 
performance, unless at the time of conclusion of the contract the debtor 
did not foresee and could not reasonably be expected to have foreseen 
that result . . . . 
 67. See CESL, supra note 4, at art. 87.2: 
Non-performance of an obligation by one party is fundamental if: (a) it 
substantially deprives the other party of what that party was entitled to 
expect under the contract, unless at the time of conclusion of the contract 
the non-performing party did not foresee and could not be expected to 
have foreseen that result; or (b) it is of such a nature as to make it clear 
that the non-performing party’s future performance cannot be relied on. 




“substantial deprivation” in the PECL). Substantial deprivation is 
related to the expectations of the aggrieved party. In addition, the 
party’s special expectations for the performance of the contract are 
also relevant for ascertaining whether the breach was fundamental. 
The breach is fundamental regardless of whether it occurred in re-
spect to a primary obligation or an ancillary obligation. What should 
be taken into consideration is the importance of the aggrieved 
party’s interests, and this is a matter for judicial discretion.68 
In Spain, there is an important body of case law reinterpreting 
the concept of fundamental breach in the light of harmonized Euro-
pean legal texts. The idea is that not every case of non-performance 
by one of the contractual parties authorizes the other to terminate the 
contract, according to the fundamental principle of “conservation of 
the contract.”69 
Highly illustrative is the Supreme Court judgment of May 23, 
201470 regarding the sale of a parking-garage place. The Court held 
that the less than expected height of the entrance door and the risk 
of water filtration did not prevent the usefulness or suitability of the 
object to be used in accordance with the nature of the contract. It 
was not therefore a fundamental breach of the contract making ter-
mination possible. The Supreme Court expressly referred to Euro-
pean Contract Law and the CISG.  
In the opinion of the Court, fundamental breach relates to the 
satisfaction of the interest of the creditor. The focus of attention is 
not the possible breach of duties established in the contract or im-
plemented in accordance with the principle of good faith. To deter-
mine the content of the satisfaction of the creditor, one has to take 
into account the interests involved in the conclusion of the contract, 
identified according to the so called “basis of the contract,” the spe-
cific cause of the contract, whether that is expressed in it or is simply 
                                                                                                             
 68. GUENTER H. TREITEL, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT—A 
COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT 350 (Clarendon Press 1988). 
 69. Cf. Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Feb. 25, 2013 (R.J. 2013, 7413). 
 70. Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., May 23, 2014 (R.J. 2014, 3878). 




known to both parties, and the type and characteristics of the con-
tract concluded. This is in line with art. 25 of the CISG. Spanish 
courts use terms like “frustration of the practical purpose pursued” 
or refer to the “legitimate expectations” of the parties when conclud-
ing the contract.71 
This solution is in accordance with the principle of the conser-
vation of the contract.72  
3. Specific Performance and Compensation for Damages  
Conceptually, in the field of remedies for the breach of contract, 
there are great differences between common law and civil law coun-
tries. Compensation for damages has been the ordinary remedy in 
common law countries for a breach of contract, while the civil law 
aims at specific performance,73 although at present this distinction 
                                                                                                             
 71. The basis of the contract can be defined as the aim pursued by one of the 
contractual parties that was known and accepted by the other, and was reflected 
in the economic consequences of the contract. For instance, in the judgment of the 
Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Nov. 12, 2014 (R.J. 2014, 5911), the delay in the 
delivery of the immovable that was sold, is considered as a fundamental breach 
by interpreting the contract according to its basis. In this case, the object of the 
contract was a piece of developable land, and the deadline for the execution of the 
deed was fundamental (otherwise, the buyer would not have had the opportunity 
to apply for the building licence). 
In addition, the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., June 13, 2014 
(R.J. 2014, 3435), solves a case of a fundamental breach of the contract by the 
seller. The parties had concluded a contract of sale for a piece of land that the 
buyers had planned to develop. After the conclusion of the contract, a new admin-
istrative regulation was adopted that meant that the building process was no longer 
possible, as the immovable was now listed as a building of Cultural Interest. The 
Supreme Court considered that this was not a case of a risk that should be held by 
the buyer (res perit emptore). While, generally speaking, it is true that the buyer 
assumes the risk represented by a change in land development regulations, in this 
case, the fact that the buyer intended to develop the piece of land occupied by the 
building (that it was no longer possible to demolish), was considered a basic ele-
ment of the contractual object and for that reason, a principal obligation of the 
seller (according to the basis of the contract). 
 72. Cf. Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Jan. 3, 1991 (R.J. 1991, 105). In this 
case, termination is not possible, as the breach is not fundamental. Otherwise, 
there would be a violation of the principle of conservation of the contract. This 
principle avoids possible situations of fraud and meets the essential aim of com-
plying with the expressed will of the contracting parties to satisfy the needs of the 
economy of the contract. 
 73. Alex Geert Castermans, Ruben de Graaff, & Matthias Haentjens, The 
Digital Single Market and Legal Certainty: A Critical Analysis, in 7 CONTENTS 




is no longer so sharp.74 In the CISG the question is not resolved, 
leaving the decision to the national courts.75 
Directive 1999/44 bridges the gap between the two options by 
giving the seller the opportunity to cure the lack of conformity. In 
the regime of the Directive, the consequences of a breach of the con-
tract are not completely determined by the buyer’s option for one or 
                                                                                                             
AND EFFECTS OF CONTRACTS-LESSONS TO LEARN FROM THE COMMON EUROPEAN 
SALES LAW, STUDIES IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC LAW AND REGULATION 60 (Aure-
lia Colombi Ciacchi ed., Springer 2016). 
 74. The new version of the Uniform Commercial Code makes the remedy of 
specific performance possible. To accommodate buyers who want the goods and 
not money, the Code offers sections 2-716 and 2-502. See UCC, supra note 24, at 
section 2-716: 
(1) Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or 
in other proper circumstances. 
(2) The decree for specific performance may include such terms and con-
ditions as to payment of the price, damages, or other relief as the court 
may deem just. 
(3) The buyer has a right to replevin for goods identified to the contract 
if after reasonable effort he is unable to effect cover for such goods or 
the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing 
or if the goods have been shipped under reservation and satisfaction of 
the security interest in them has been made or tendered. 
“Of course the Code drafters did not write on a tabula rasa here but upon a slate 
already crowded with centuries of judicial and legislative markings.” Cf. JAMES 
WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 314 (6th ed., West 
2010). 
The Sale of Goods Act, 1979, c.54 (UK), at section 52, governs specific perfor-
mance in English sales law and common law principles are provided by the sec-
tion 62(2) of the same Act. Specific performance under English sales law will 
only be granted to an aggrieved buyer of goods at the discretion of the court. This 
will be in the form of a judgment or order, requiring the seller to deliver the goods 
to the buyer in conformity with the terms of the contract when the goods are 
unique and damages are proved to be inadequate. 
Furthermore, in English law, the court can have the power to order that a specific 
performance is carried by a party to a contract. The Consumer Rights Act, 2015, 
c.15 (UK), at sections 23-24, contains rights which allow consumers to have items 
replaced and repaired if they do not adequately conform to the terms of the con-
tract which were originally agreed on between the parties. 
 75. See CISG, supra note 3, at art. 28: 
If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one party is 
entitled to require performance of any obligation by the other party, a 
court is not bound to enter a judgment for specific performance unless 
the court would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts 
of sale not governed by this Convention. 




another or by the mere economic interest of the seller.76  
Specific performance is a remedy that fits one of the general 
principles of the law present in EU contract law, which is the con-
servation of the contract.77 One has to put this in relation to the ter-
mination of the contract, which is a remedy of an exceptional char-
acter in the common law and in the civil law tradition.  
From a dogmatic point of view, it was said that French law used 
specific performance, not because of any supposed underlying eco-
nomic efficiency of this remedy, but in order to grant the creditor, 
who is the victim of a breach of contract, satisfaction in the form of 
the expected benefit available when an award of only damages 
seemed unfair.  
Nevertheless, some scholars consider this well-known “princi-
ple” of French law only didactic, conjured up by academics in order 
to categorize and influence case law.78  
                                                                                                             
 76. By means of the transposition of the Directive 1999/44, supra note 16, 
under Dutch Law, this remedial scheme has now gained an even more subtle char-
acter, which gives the courts more power to intervene when a particular solution 
is seen as disproportionate. See Castermans, de Graaff, & Haentjens, supra note 
73, at 61. 
 77. Directive 1999/44, supra note 16, in this particular topic, has “its basis in 
the principle of conservation of the contract. Repair and replacement of the goods 
are, in fact, remedies which enjoy priority, in that they bring about the exact exe-
cution of the sale.” See Massimo C. Bianca, Article 3: Rights of the Consumer, in 
E.U. SALES DIRECTIVE—COMMENTARY 168 (Massimo C. Bianca & Stefan 
Grundmann eds., Intersentia 2002). In addition, this principle is reflected in the 
CESL, supra note 4, at C. Annex II (32): “The Common European Sales Law 
should aim at the preservation of a valid contract whenever possible and appro-
priate in view of the legitimate interests of the parties.” 
 78. See Yves-Marie Laithier, Comparative Reflections on the French Law of 
Remedies for Breach of Contract, in COMPARATIVE REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT 103-122 (Nili Cohen & Ewan McKendrick eds., Hart Publ’g 2005). 
The author analyses a judgment of the French Cour de cassation [Cass] [supreme 
court for judicial matters], Cass. Civ. 3, June 24, 1971, Bull. Civ. III, no. 408, 
which refuses to state that specific performance is, as a matter of “principle” avail-
able to a creditor who is the victim of a breach of contract. In this case, the Cour 
de cassation approved the court of appeal’s refusal to grant specific performance 
and to award damages instead. The defects were not significant enough to require 
the rebuilding of the construction. The building contractor could avoid specific 
performance and substitute a pecuniary compensation for the specific perfor-
mance. 




The situation has changed with the French revision of obliga-
tions by Ordinance no. 2016-131, Feb. 10, 2016. It has introduced 
an important modification so that specific performance can be ex-
cluded if there is an imbalance between the cost of the enforcement 
for the debtor and its benefit for the creditor.79 
Moreover, the general starting point in German law is that the 
parties to a contract are entitled to demand performance of their re-
spective obligations in kind. “The effect of an obligation,” says BGB 
§ 241, “is that the creditor is entitled to claim performance from the 
obligor” (it is also contained in PECL art. 9:102). The most im-
portant exception is fixed in BGB § 275 (1): a claim for specific 
performance is excluded, as far as such performance is impossible.  
Also, according to BGB § 275 (2), “(t)he obligor may refuse 
performance to the extent that performance requires expense and ef-
fort which, taking into account the subject matter of the obligation 
and the requirements of good faith, is grossly disproportionate to the 
interest in performance of the obligee.” When it is determined what 
efforts may reasonably be required of the obligor, it must also be 
taken into account whether he is responsible for the obstacle to per-
formance. This version of BGB § 275 (2) is based on considerations 
which can also be found in the PECL. In this sense, art. 9:102 (2)(b) 
of the PECL states that specific performance cannot be obtained 
where performance would cause the debtor unreasonable effort or 
expense. In Spanish law, one can find statements to the effect that 
specific performance is the general and preferential remedy in cases 
of breach of contract, although this is not always true.80 
                                                                                                             
 79. Cf. Code Civil [C. CIV.] art. 1221 (Fr.): “The creditor of an obligation 
may, after a putting in default, seek execution in kind unless such execution is 
impossible or unless there is a manifest disproportion between the cost to the 
debtor and the interest of the creditor.” See on the French revision, Mustapha 
Mekki, The French Reform of Contract Law: The Art of Redoing Without Undo-
ing, 10 J. CIV. L. STUD. 223 (2017). 
 80. Fernando Gómez Pomar, El incumplimiento contractual en Derecho es-
pañol, 3 INDRET 16 (2007). Despite some rhetorical manifestations of the Su-
preme Court, in Spanish Law, specific performance does not seem to be the gen-
eral remedy in cases of breach of contract. It is generally but not necessarily pref-




Specific performance has a “bigger content” in Spanish Law due 
to the transposition of Directive 1999/44, as in certain contracts of 
sale it is possible to demand the repair and the replacement of goods 
that do not conform to the contract.  
However, the idea that the creditor has a right to specific perfor-
mance is an idea that can be questioned as it can create an excessive 
burden for the debtor, and the reasonableness of introducing other 
limits to this remedy, different from impossibility and good faith, is 
currently under discussion. This kind of reasoning approximates 
civil law and common law solutions, as it was traditionally common 
law that granted greater importance to economic considerations in 
the implementation of remedies for breach of contract.81  
Furthermore, according to Spanish case law, the defendant can-
not refuse compensation for damages on the grounds that he would 
prefer specific performance.82  
4. The Change of Circumstances 
a. The Change of Circumstances in Harmonized European Law 
The principle of pacta sunt servanda is universally recognized. 
Contracts are binding because individuals are willing to fulfil them 
and they trust that their counterparts will do the same. If all contracts 
were generally reviewable, the confidence of the economic agents 
                                                                                                             
erential to the remedy of compensation for damages. The author quotes a judg-
ment of the Supreme Court of Spain, S.T.S., July 2, 1998 (R.J. 1998, 5123), where 
specific performance was not impossible, but the cost of compliance was so dis-
proportionate that the remedy of compensation for damages was more appropri-
ate. 
 81. The situation is similar in the Netherlands where, on the basis of the re-
quirements of reasonableness and equity, it is thought that “the creditor may not 
demand specific performance if that remedy would unreasonably burden the 
debtor and the specific performance would not be more beneficial to the creditor 
than another remedy would have been.” See M.B.M. Loos, Section 1: Right to 
Performance, in THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW AND DUTCH 
LAW—A COMMENTARY 355 (Danny Busch, Ewoud Hondius, Hugo Van Kooten, 
Wendy Schrama, & Harriet Schelhaas eds., Kluwer 2002). 
 82. Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Oct. 10, 2012 (R.J. 2013, 1537). 




would vanish, and it is confidence that is fundamental in any eco-
nomic system. In any case, the idea that, as a general rule, contracts 
are binding and, therefore, in the case of non-performance generate 
some kind of responsibility, is a necessary condition for the efficient 
functioning of the economic system. 
Yet, in many legal systems, a fundamental change to the circum-
stances of a contract can serve to loosen the binding nature of that 
contract. The legal doctrine that provides this effect is called by var-
ious names in different European countries. In previous European 
instruments, such as the PECL, and the DCFR, the term used has 
been “change of circumstances,” also to be found in the CESL.83 
In comparing article 89 of the CESL with its precedents in the 
PECL and the DCFR, we can conclude that there are no great dif-
ferences in their respective rules. In all of them, at the very begin-
ning, there is an explicit recognition of the principle pacta sunt 
servanda. Nevertheless, this principle can be moderated in cases 
where there is a change of circumstances that makes the contract 
more onerous, either because it has increased the value of the per-
formance or because it has devalued the consideration. The impact 
that the exceptional change of circumstances would have on the con-
tract is described in different words: “performance of the contract 
becomes excessively onerous” in the PECL; the contract “becomes 
so onerous . . . that it would be manifestly unjust to hold the debtor 
to the obligation” in the DCFR; and “performance becomes exces-
sively onerous” in the CESL. On the other hand, there is no hierar-
chy established between a variation of the contract or its termina-
tion; the decision in each case is left to the judge. The remedy of 
termination does not present a huge problem: the judge will deter-
mine its consequences. As for variation, the terminology changes, 
“adapt the contract in order to distribute between the parties in a just 
                                                                                                             
 83. Cf. PECL, supra note 21, at art. 6:111; DCFR, supra note 31, at art. I. - 
1:103; CESL, supra note 4, at art. 89. 
 
 




and equitable manner the losses and gains” in the PECL; “vary the 
obligation in order to make it reasonable and equitable in the new 
circumstances” in the DCFR; and “adapt the contract in order to 
bring it into accordance with what the parties would reasonably have 
agreed at the time of contracting if they had taken the change of 
circumstances into account” in the CESL. 
Both the CESL and the PECL, as a consequence, first establish 
the duty to renegotiate. The DCRF refers directly to the judge's in-
tervention, but renegotiation is a prerequisite for the application of 
that intervention. Apart from that, the requirements for the applica-
tion of this intervention almost totally coincide, except that art. III.-
1:110 of the DCFR is applicable to both contractual obligations and 
obligations arising from a unilateral legal act. The inclusion of the 
latter category is not a common feature of national jurisdictions or 
international instruments. Its inclusion in the DCFR has its justifi-
cation in the protection of the debtor in cases of unilateral contracts 
that, in most cases, are gratuitous in nature. 
On the other hand, it is only in the PECL that the court may 
award damages for the loss suffered through a party refusing to ne-
gotiate or breaking off negotiations contrary to good faith and fair 
dealing.84 
This rule of an “unexpected change of circumstances” does not 
have an equivalent in every legal system of the Member States, but 
there are some that recognise this legal doctrine. 
b. Change of Circumstances in Spanish Law 
The legal doctrine used to solve problems arising from unex-
pected circumstances in Spanish Law is the so-called rebus sic stan-
tibus clause. This remedy seeks to restore the equilibrium of the con-
tract, which has been destroyed as a result of an unforeseeable 
change of circumstances. There is no regulation of the clause in the 
                                                                                                             
 84. See Luz M. Martinez Velencoso, Change of Circumstances, in 
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CESL, supra note 19, at 137-163. 




Spanish Civil Code; instead it has been developed by the courts. Ac-
cording to jurisprudence, the requirements for the application of the 
clause are the following: the clause is only applicable to deferred 
execution contracts or contracts that should be performed at succes-
sive intervals; and the change of circumstances should be unforesee-
able. 
There must be a change in the basis of the contract due to the 
fact that the equilibrium of the contract has been affected or because 
the aim of the contract has been frustrated. 
The change in the basis of the contract must be considered “rea-
sonably” extraordinary and unforeseeable at the moment of the con-
clusion of the contract. For that reason, it is not possible to apply the 
clause when the change of circumstances concerns a contractual risk 
that has been assumed by the parties. The inclusion of the concept 
of reasonableness comes from the recent judgments of the Spanish 
Supreme Court, because traditionally it was understood that the 
change of circumstances should be utterly extraordinary and should 
mean a total destruction of the equilibrium of the contract.  
In many judgments, the application of the clause has been dis-
missed because there was an express assumption of the risk of a 
change of circumstances in the contract, or that the change of cir-
cumstances formed part of the normal distribution of risks (deter-
mined either contractually or statutorily).85  
In addition, the change in circumstances must be unforeseeable. 
This requirement is difficult to meet, because in modern society, 
certain risks are not natural but artificial, in the sense that they arise 
as a social product, and it is very difficult in some cases to anticipate 
                                                                                                             
 85. For example, in the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S, June 
16, 1983 (R.J. 1983, 3632), concerning a contract for the execution of building 
works, there was a clause excluding justification for late delivery of the building 
in the event that the workers went on strike. For that reason, the Supreme Court 
did not apply the clause rebus sic stantibus when the work became more expen-
sive than initially expected, because of strike action. There was also another 
clause stipulating that the price should not be increased. 




and to insure against them. Thus, unforeseeability should be as-
sessed in relation to the type of contract and the amount of infor-
mation to which the contracting parties had access to at the time of 
contracting.86 
Furthermore, none of the parties must be responsible for the 
change of circumstances, because it is unfair to grant a defence 
mechanism to a party who is being held to account because he vio-
lated the duty of care to avoid the risk that was required of him ac-
cording to the principle of good faith.87 
As for the effects arising from the change of circumstances of 
the contract, although only a few judgments in the past accepted the 
application of the clause to the case under consideration, some of 
them have allowed the termination of the contract, while others have 
opted for its modification. The modification of the contract is done 
by the court through an integrated interpretation of the content of the 
contract. The legal basis for this integrated interpretation is art. 1258 
CC, which states that, apart from the agreed obligations, parties 
should also respect the obligations arising from the principle of good 
faith.88 
                                                                                                             
 86. For that reason, depreciation of currency is not considered an unforesee-
able circumstance, according to the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, 
S.T.S., Dec. 14, 1940 (R.J. 1940, 1135), involving a contract for the sale of a 
mine; the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Mar. 26, 1963 (R.J. 
1963, 2120), on the use of water by a community; and the judgment of the Spanish 
Supreme Court, S.T.S., Nov. 31, 1963 (R.J. 1963, 4264), on a mine leasing con-
tract. 
Other cases have held that, the alteration of the value of the assets, in the period 
between the time of conclusion of the contract and its performance, is not an un-
foreseeable circumstance. See the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., 
June 5, 1945; the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Oct. 6, 1987 
(R.J. 1987, 6720); the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., May 29, 
1996 (R.J. 1996, 3862); and the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., 
Apr. 27, 2012 (R.J. 2012, 4714). 
 87. See the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Apr. 19, 1985 
(R.J. 1985, 1804); the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Nov. 19, 
1994 (R.J. 1994, 8539); and the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., 
Nov. 15, 2000 (R.J. 2000, 9214). 
 88. In the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Nov. 23, 1962 
(R.J. 1962, 5005), the effect of the clause was to modify the contract. However, 
two judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court declared the termination of the con-
tract, S.T.S., Jan. 28, 1970 (R.J.1970, 503) and S.T.S., Mar. 23, 1988 (R.J. 1988, 




There has recently been a change of perspective in this doctrine 
developed by the Spanish Supreme Court due to the ongoing effects 
of the financial crisis on the Spanish economy and the influence of 
harmonized European private law (the PECL, the DCFR, and the 
CESL). For instance, in the judgment of June 30, 2014,89 quoting 
the PECL and the DCFR, the Spanish Supreme Court came to the 
conclusion that it is necessary to reinterpret the old doctrine of rebus 
sic stantibus according to these harmonized European texts. Refer-
ring to an advertising contract, the court states that: “Economic ex-
pectations about the advertising activity formed part of the basis of 
the contract (the price could be increased if the benefits increased as 
well).” As the annual turnover decreased substantially due to the fi-
nancial crisis, the price should be reduced, according to the court 
and in this case also the legal consequence was the modification of 
the contract by the court and not its termination.  
Another important milestone was the judgment of Oct. 15, 
201490 that concerned the lease contract of a hotel. The Supreme 
Court following its previous doctrine about the necessity of modern-
izing the old rebus sic stantibus doctrine came to the conclusion that 
the rent should be revised as it had been proved that, in the city of 
Valencia, in 2009, the income of this kind of companies had fallen 
by 42.3% per room. The rent should correspondingly be reduced by 
29% (according to an expert opinion). Even after the reduction “the 
resulting income would be superior by 20% in relation to the market 




                                                                                                             
2228). In other judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court, the effect was the mod-
ification of the contract, S.T.S., July 9, 1984 (R.J. 1984, 3803); S.T.S., Nov. 6, 
1992 (R.J. 1992, 9226); and S.T.S., July 21, 2010 (R.J. 2010, 3897). 
 89.  Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., June 30, 2014 (Rec. 2250/2012). 
 90.  Spanish Supreme Court, S.T.S., Oct. 15, 2014 (Rec. 2992/2012). 




III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In Spain, although a proposal to reform the Civil Code (Law of 
Obligations) has been published by the Spanish Ministry of Justice, 
the necessary modernization of the Civil Code has not yet taken 
place. This task has, nevertheless, been assumed by the Spanish Su-
preme Court interpreting the harmonized European Law as an in-
strument to integrate national law, especially through the construc-
tion of a new system of contractual liability (unitary concept of non-
performance, lack of conformity of the goods, and termination by 
means of a fundamental breach).  
Also, the influence of the so called acquis communautaire can 
be observed in Spanish Law. The various European Directives for 
the protection of consumers have been the object of transposition in 
Spain through different special acts that were finally gathered to-
gether in one single act, the Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007, Nov. 
16, 2007, approving the revised text of the General Law for the Pro-
tection of Consumers and Users. Spanish Courts, applying this text, 
have developed some important principles, like the so-called control 
of transparency, understood as an instrument to make sure that “the 
consumer has real knowledge of what the financial sacrifice is and 
of the legal burden that is derived from the contract”91 in cases of 
standardized contracts. Consequently, any clauses introduced in the 
contract that suffer from this lack of transparency should be declared 
null and void. 
Finally, the influence of harmonized European Law can be ob-
served in relation to the change of the circumstances of the contract, 
particularly important because of the ongoing effects of the financial 
crisis on the Spanish economy. There is no regulation of this legal 
institution in the Spanish Civil Code; instead it has been developed 
by case law. There has recently been a change of perspective in this 
doctrine developed by the Spanish Supreme Court due mainly to the 
influence of harmonized European private law (the PECL, the 
                                                                                                             
 91. See judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, Sept. 8, 2014, supra note 9. 




DCFR, and the CESL), softening the strict previous requirements 
and consequences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
